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Abstract
A contingent plan is consistent if the specification for any particular contingency
in the plan is invariant to the set of alternative contingencies or, equivalently, is
independent of irrelevant information emerging from alternative contingencies or
choice problems. Our experiments show that consistency may be obtainable when
choice problems are complete, with monetary and immediate outcomes, but is likely
to face violation in more complex settings. We further found that decisions are more
likely to change when irrelevant information arises rather than subsides, and that
any observed failure of consistency has the use of irrelevant information in decision-
making at its core.
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1 Introduction
Consider a decision-maker who knows she will face one of many possible contingent out-
comes or contingencies in the future, and is formulating a contingent plan. The plan will
specify which choice she will make among the available options given whichever particu-
lar contingency is actually realized. Suppose we conceive of each contingency as a fully
specified choice problem in and of itself and allow the decision-maker to be cognizant of
all relevant aspects of these different choice problems at the time of formulation of the
contingent plan. Then a question is whether the plan is consistent in the sense that the
specification for any particular contingency in the plan formulated is invariant to the set
of alternative contingencies.
As an example, think of a person who knows she will receive a bonus this year from
her employer, and has decided to spend it to buy a car. She also knows that the bonus
amount will be either $10,000 or $25,000. She does not know however which amount
it will be. She is deciding which car to buy in either eventuality or contingency. She
has completed her research and test drives and narrowed her choice down to between
the Toyota Tercel and the Hyundai Elantra in case she receives $10,000, and between
the Volkswagen Passat and the Nissan Altima in case she receives $25,000. Suppose she
formulates the plan (Tercel if 10, Passat if 25).
Now consider the same scenario as above except that the amounts are $25,000 and
$50,000. After completing her research and test drives, she has narrowed the choice down
to between the Mercedes-Benz E250 and the BMW 528i if she receives $50,000. Her
possible choices remain the Passat and the Altima in case she receives $25,000.
The issue of consistency surrounds her specification for the $25,000 contingency. If
she specifies the Passat in the second scenario for this contingency, then we can say
her plan is consistent, as her choice for the $25,000 contingency remains the same no
matter what alternative contingency ($10,000 or $50,000) she contemplates at the time
of plan formulation. But if she specifies the Altima, then her decision-making displays
inconsistency, and raises the possibility that her choice for any particular problem may
in general be influenced by information arising from other, and in principle unrelated,
problems.
From the standpoint of economic rationality, one would expect contingent plans to
be consistent. This is because each contingency is viewed as a fully specified, standard
choice problem (see Rubinstein [10]). Thus the choice for a particular problem, say A,
should be based only on information emerging from A. Information arriving from other
2
problems should not affect her choice for A, as such information is essentially irrelevant
as far as her decision regarding A is concerned.
Indeed, the idea that consistency may be fundamentally associated with rationality
has received formal attention in economic theory. Green and Osband [5] for example relate
consistency of action in the face of changing information and probability assessments to
the characterizability of expected utility maximization. Green and Park [6] develop this
point further, particularly in the context of contingent plans, and argue that consistency
of contingent choices may be necessary and sufficient for such plans to be rationalizable
by maximization of conditional expected utility. Zambrano [13] in turn points out that
such a condition is essentially equivalent to requiring that a contingent plan not react to
irrelevant information.
Evidence has mounted from experimental psychology on the other hand that the pres-
ence of irrelevant or extraneous information can affect decision-making. In an early such
study, Bodenhausen and Wyer [1] found that subject’s decisions with respect to punish-
ment in hypothetical infringement cases could depend on whether the name given to the
offender was stereotypical or not. Coman, Coman and Hirst [2] similarly found that sub-
ject choices in a medical decision-making experiment reacted to the presence of irrelevant
information on the hypothesized available treatment.
Since alternative contingencies represent irrelevant information, from the perspective
of any specific contingency or choice problem, these indicate that consistency of contin-
gent plans may not always be satisfied in reality. Further, such effects have also been
demonstrated in studies using experts as subjects. Dror, Charlton and Pe´ron [3] for ex-
ample showed that fingerprint experts could change decisions regarding identification of
subjects once presented with extraneous information. Jørgensen and Grimstad [9] simi-
larly showed that estimates by expert software developers of time required for software
development could depend on the presence of irrelevant information.
The presence of these two conflicting strands suggests the need for resolution. This
paper reports results from laboratory experiments designed to help advance understanding
of whether and when choices can be invariant to irrelevant information in the form of
an alternative contingency, or when contingent plans can be consistent. Our subjects
faced several decision problems, each framed as a contingency. Each was faced twice,
once in conjunction with another choice problem (an alternative contingency), in a two-
contingency situation, and once unitarily, as a single-contingency situation. The question
was whether on average the two choices for a decision problem, from the two different
occasions it was encountered, were the same or differed from each other.
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Our within subject design raises the issue of order: does whether a subject is exposed
to two-contingency situations before or after the ones with a single contingency matter?
We counterbalanced and used order as a treatment variable to address this question: one
group of subjects faced two-contingency situations prior to single-contingency ones, while
the sequence was reversed for the other group. Our findings indicated order mattered
and inconsistency was more likely if single-contingency situations preceded ones with two
contingencies.
A possible explanation for this finding may lie in the relation between the information
available and the choice made. In particular, if all information available, relevant or not,
is used to decide choice on the first occasion, and is also retained in memory at the time
of the second decision, then stability of choice may be more likely to be observed if there
is a reduction in the information set through exclusion of irrelevant information, than if
there is an expansion through inclusion.1
We also conjectured that consistency would be greater if problems were complete, and
had possible outcomes which were monetary and immediate. Our two experiments there-
fore developed two different environments. Experiment 1 had salient choice and subjects
chose allocations in financial securities with fully specified outcomes and probabilities.
Choice in Experiment 2 was hypothetical and subjects confronted a variety of everyday
goods, durables, activities, assets and services. For each problem, they had to choose
one of two alternatives, compared on four dimensions. They were also allowed to record
indifference.
Our results provide support for our conjecture. Choices in Experiment 1 were mostly
consistent, with some signs of inconsistency when single-contingency situations were ear-
lier in the order. Those in Experiment 2 by contrast displayed significant inconsistency,
especially when single-contingency situations were earlier in the order.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our design and procedure are detailed
in Section 2, which also develops the specific hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents
our analysis, while Section 4 concludes.
2 Design and Procedure, and Hypotheses
There was a single session for every treatment irrespective of experiment. Moreover, each
treatment had 35 subjects, who were recruited using flyers, word of mouth and email
1On average, about 15 minutes elapsed between the two occasions for any subject.
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solicitations. No subject participated in more than one treatment. Each treatment took
about 45 minutes to complete. We now discuss specific features of the two experiments.
2.1 Experiment 1: Salient choice experiment
For the salient choice experiment, subjects had to decide investments in financial securi-
ties. For every choice problem, they had an endowment of 100 which they had to allocate
across two financial securities (in integer amounts). An example of such a choice problem
is given below.
You have an endowment of 100.
How much will you invest in 1 if the options are
(the remaining amount will be invested in 2):
1 2
return probability return probability
0.23 0.15 3.32 0.74
2.13 0.85 0.99 0.24
The table gives possible returns (per unit of investment), together with associated
probabilities, for the two securities. We constructed each security such that (i) one possible
return lay between 1 and 4, and the other lay between 0 and 1, and (ii) the expected value
exceeded 1. Further, every security lay on one of two indifference curves constructed using
a mean-variance utility function:
u = µ− λ
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σ2
where µ is the mean, σ2 is the variance, and λ is a parameter (the Arrow-Pratt risk-
aversion index, see Sargent [11]). We took λ = 3, as is commonly done in the applied
finance literature (see Fabozzi, Kolm, Pachamanova and Forcardi [4]). The two utility
values chosen were 1.156 and 1.056. Half the securities lay on each indifference curve.
We constructed 40 such choice problems, with a total of 80 (= 40× 2) securities. We
designate 20 of these as reference problems, and the remaining 20 as alternate problems
(subjects were not exposed to these terms). For every problem, reference or alternate,
both securities lay on the same indifference curve.
Subjects faced each of these 20 reference problems on two different occasions, once on
its own, in a single-contingency situation, and once in combination with an alternate prob-
lem, in a two-contingency situation (subjects were not exposed to the term contingency).
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Hence subjects faced 60 problems in 40 situations, 20 with a single contingency (only ref-
erence problems; the set of alternative contingencies being the null set) and 20 with two
contingencies (reference-alternate pairs; the set of alternative contingencies being a sin-
gleton). A single-contingency example has already been given above. A two-contingency
example is given below:
You have an endowment of 100.
How much will you invest in 1 if the options are
(the remaining amount will be invested in 2):
1 2
return probability return probability
0.23 0.15 3.32 0.74
2.13 0.85 0.99 0.24
What if the options are instead
(again, what you do not invest in 1A
will be automatically invested in 2A):
1A 2A
return probability return probability
0.48 0.2 0.84 0.2
2.19 0.8 3.7 0.8
Subjects thus had to make 60 choices, 20 for single-contingency situations, and 40
for two-contingency situations. Subjects were presented example problems and situations
with earning calculations during instruction, and were aware from the beginning they
would be facing problems in two different kinds of situations (see Appendix for instruc-
tions).
There were two treatments, T11 and T12. In T11, subjects faced single-contingency
situations first, followed by two-contingency situations, while in T12, subjects faced two-
contingency situations first, followed by single-contingency situations.
Subjects received a show-up fee. Additionally, for each subject, five of the sixty
problems were picked at random, and corresponding securities implemented in accordance
with actual investment decisions, and the average of the resulting outcomes was given as
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payment privately at the end of the session. Subjects were aware of the payment rule and
received INR 300 on average2.
Subjects were first assembled together, each in front of a computer terminal. After
receiving instructions through a projector, they connected to an internet form, where
they entered their choices. The first page of the form repeated the instructions already
given. Experiment 1 was conducted at Ambedkar University in Delhi, India. Subjects
were mainly undergraduate students from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds.
2.2 Experiment 2 : Hypothetical choice experiment
For the hypothetical choice experiment, subjects’ choice problems concerned a variety of
everyday consumer goods, durables, activities, assets and services.3 Each problem had
two (definite) options, drawn from the same product. Subjects could choose any one of
them and were also allowed to be indifferent. For every definite option in every problem,
4 characteristics were displayed. An example of such a choice problem is given below:
Which cup would you prefer if the options are C1, C2 and C3?
C1 C2 C3
1. Small 1. Small-Medium
2. No handle. 2. With handle
3. White with floral pattern 3. Light yellow no pattern Indifferent
4. Normal design 4. Octagonal design.
We again constructed 40 such choice problems, 20 reference and 20 alternate. One
reference and one alternate problem were developed for each product. As before, subjects
faced each reference problem twice, once in a single-contingency situation, and once in a
two-contingency situation. For the latter cases, reference and alternate problems in any
situation were for the same product. A two-contingency example is given below:
Subjects thus again had to make 60 choices (they had seen examples and aware from the
beginning they would be facing the two different kinds of situations: see Appendix for
2The purchasing power parity exchange rate between the Indian Rupee and the US Dollar for 2009
was 15 rupees to a dollar according to the Penn World Tables ( [7]).
3A total of 20: cup, mobile, medical facility, restaurant, shopping, route, flat, bank, car, camera, com-
puter, B-school, investment, internet connection, entertainment, picnic, accommodation, travel agency,
mosquito coil, movie theater.
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Which cup would you prefer if the options are C1, C2 and C3?
C1 C2 C3
1. Small 1. Small-Medium
2. No handle. 2. With handle
3. White with floral pattern 3. Light yellow no pattern Indifferent
4. Normal design 4. Octagonal design.
What if the options are instead
C1A C2A C3A
1. Small-Medium 1. Small
2. Base smaller than rim. 2. Base and rim are of same size
3. Black with geometric pattern 3. White with blue band Indifferent
4. Hexagonal design 4. Hexagonal design.
instructions). There were two treatments as before, T21 and T22. Subjects faced single-
contingency situations first in T21, followed by two-contingency situations. The sequence
was reversed in T22.
The experiment was hand-run. Subjects were assembled together and, after receiving
instructions, were administered a questionnaire containing the problems.
Experiment 2 was conducted at Ramakrishna Mission Vidyamandir College in Belur,
near Calcutta, India. Subjects were undergraduate students from a variety of disciplinary
backgrounds.
The college (run by missionaries) did not permit any monetary payments to the stu-
dents. Volunteer subjects were given a lunch packet worth about INR 300 in lieu of a
participation fee.
2.3 Hypotheses
A strong position in favor of consistency would present the hypothesis that all subjects
choose consistently for any decision problem. A weaker and more reasonable hypothesis is
that there is consistency on average (after aggregating all problems faced by all subjects),
which does not depend on order. We call this hypothesis E.
Hypothesis E: Subjects choose consistently on average in both orders. There is no
difference in the degree of consistency across orders.
Against this, we posit the hypothesis of inconsistency, i.e., there is some deviation from
consistency on average. Coupled with the idea that choice inconsistency or instability is
less likely when there is a reduction in the information set, than an expansion, we have
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hypothesis P.
Hypothesis P: There is inconsistency in choice on average, irrespective of order. In-
consistency is greater when single contingency situations are faced first.
As a compromise, we frame an intermediate hypothesis, I. This allows choices to be
consistent when two-contingency situations are faced first, but not otherwise.
Hypothesis I: On average, choices are consistent when two-contingency situations are
faced first, and diplay inconsistency when single contingency situations are faced first.
3 Results
We first present results from Experiment 1.
3.1 Experiment 1
The central question is whether a subject chooses differently the two occasions she faces
any reference problem. Evidence of substantial difference would militate against the
hypothesis of consistency. To address this, we calculated two average allocations per
subject across all 20 problems (for reference problems only), one for choices from the first
occasion, and the other for the second-occasion choices.
In T11, mean and median first-occasion allocations across all subjects were respectively
46.5 and 46.1, while corresponding mean and median second-occasion allocations were
respectively 49.3 and 50.1. The numbers for T12 were 53.1 and 51.3 (respectively mean
and median for first-occasion allocations), and 54.3 and 54.1 (respectively mean and
median for second-occasion allocations).
We then tested whether these two matched samples (within each treatment sepa-
rately), each with 35 observations, one for each subject, yielded the same average. The
following table gives two-tailed p-values from t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Table 1: Overview of treatments T11 and T12
T11 T12
t-test 0.1042 0.4015
Wilcoxon 0.0099∗∗ 0.2870
∗∗ p < 0.01
We found there was no statistical difference between subjects’ average first-occasion
and second-occasion allocations for T12. The t-test gave a similar result for T11, although
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insignificance was marginal. The Wilcoxon test however indicated significant difference
between average first-occasion and second-occasion allocations for T11.
Findings from T12, where two-contingency situations were faced first, thus strongly
support the hypothesis of consistency. T11, with single-contingency situations being faced
first, on the other hand yielded an ambiguous finding, and therefore provides limited
support for the consistency hypothesis.
At the same time, the fact that subjects seemed to be more prone to display inconsis-
tency when single-contingency situations are faced earlier in the sequence is supportive of
the conjecture that decisions are more likely to be changed when irrelevant information
appears than when it disappears. In any case, the results above suggest that the order in
which subjects faced the two situations can make a difference. The suggestions is weak,
however, as all tests did not produce aligned results. We investigate this issue directly
through a treatment comparison.
To do this, we first calculated the difference in the average allocation for reference
problems across the two occasions for every subject. We then performed comparison tests
of these samples of differences across the treatments.
Our tests showed that these differences were statistically indistinguishable across the
treatments (two-tailed p-values: t-test = 0.4423, Mann-Whitney ranked sum test =
0.1253). This result therefore weakens the prior finding that order is of importance,
as, had it been, we would have expected some treatment differences (in the amount of
deviation in the allocations across the two occasions) to emerge.
We now disaggregate the data, to explore consistency at the levels of the subjects and
the problems.
3.1.1 Problems
Within any treatment, every reference problem was faced twice by any subject. For both
treatments therefore we have a series of matched pairs of allocations (35 independent
observations) for all 20 problems individually. The question is whether choices for any of
these problems display inconsistency.
We performed within treatment comparison tests for each of these problems, and found
inconsistency for two problems in T11 and one problem in T12 (allowing for significance
level upto 5%). All tests indicated consistency for all other problems. Table 2 below
identifies the problems in question and reports results from mean and median comparison
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tests.4
Table 2: Within treatment comparison by problems for T11 and T12
problem no. treatment t-test Wilcoxon
6 T11 0.0006 0.0007
15 T11 0.0002 0.0008
11 T12 0.0210 0.0412
Entries are two-tailed p-values
Signs of inconsistency at the level of problems within treatments were thus fairly weak.
We now analyze consistency across the two treatments, by studying whether difference in
allocation varies between them for any problem.
We found inconsistency only for two problems, nos. 6 and 15 identified in the prior
table. Table 3 below gives results of comparison tests for these two. All tests gave
consistency for all other problems.
Table 3: Accross treatment comparisons by problems
problem no. t-test Mann-Whitney
6 0.0200 0.0180
15 0.0002 0.0011
Entries are two-tailed p-values
There was thus no inconsistency for at least 90% of the problems in either treatment.
Further, different problems showed inconsistency in the two treatments, yielding no par-
ticular pattern.5 Our overall conclusion therefore is that the signs of consistency found in
the aggregate are strongly supported at the level of individual problems.
3.1.2 Subjects
We now perform disaggregation at the level of subjects. Since every subject participated
in only one treatment, this analysis is within treatment only. The question is whether any
of these 70 subjects in the two treatments individually displayed inconsistency. We can
use choice data from the 20 reference problems faced by any subject to help us address
4The numbers of the problems in the table refer to an order independent of the ones implemented in
the treatments.
5Categorizing any problem as either consistent or inconsistent on the basis of Table 2, we tested
whether the inconsistency rate (number of inconsistent problems) differed across the treatments. We
found no difference in terms of a two-tailed as well as a one-tailed proportion test.
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this matter. We pursued two approaches, one based on comparison tests, and the other
on regression.
For the former, we compared the first and second occasion allocations for every subject,
using Wilcoxon tests and matched sample t-tests. A subject’s choices were deemed to
be inconsistent if a significant difference was found between allocations from the two
occasions.
We used a Newey-West adjusted OLS, to account for possible failure of independence
at the level of the individual subject arising from some correlation in observation errors
across time, for the latter. Specified lags of 0, 1 and 2 yielded similar results, and we only
report outcomes for lag 1.
For any regression our specification used the difference in allocation across the two
occasions as dependent variable. No independent variable was specified. A constant was
used. Thus significance of the constant provides support to the hypothesis of inconsistency,
as, had choices been consistent, we would have expected the difference to be zero.
The constant was found to be significant for 7 subjects in T11. Results are shown in
Table 4 below.
Table 4: Newey-West regression results for T11
S3 S14 S19 S20 S22 S28 S35
constant -11.50∗∗ -26.65∗∗∗ 37.72∗ -11.25∗ -7∗ -9.25∗ -1.85∗
(3.890) (7.970) (5.735) (4.310) (3.039) (3.568) (0.683)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
For T12, the number of subjects displaying inconsistency was 4. Results are shown in
Table 5 below.
Table 5: Newey-West regression resutls for T12
S15 S23 S32 S34
constant 20∗ 15.9∗∗ -16∗∗∗ -19.05∗
(9.402) (5.135) (2.706) (7.928)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results from t-tests were nearly identical to those from the regression analysis, re-
ported above. For either treatment, the same set of subjects were identified as inconsistent
(see Tables 6 and 7). The p-values were also very similar for all subjects identified in T12
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and 4 of the subjects identified in T11. For the remainder, S3, S14 and S19, there was
some reduction in significance for S3 and S14, and considerable increase in significance
for S19.
Table 6: t-test and Wilcoxon test resutls for T11
S3 S14 S19 S20 S22 S28 S35
t-test 0.0294 0.0094 0 0.0420 0.0352 0.0327 0.0313
Wilcoxon 0.0246 0.0144 0.0001 - - 0.0177 0.0147
Entries are two-tailed p-values.
Table 7: t-test and Wilcoxon test results for T12
S15 S23 S32 S34
t-test 0.0509 0.0082 0.0002 0.0195
Wilcoxon - 0.0018 0.0009 0.0194
Entries are two-tailed p-values.
Wilcoxon tests showed results which were also similar, but not so close (again, see
Tables 6 and 7). For either treatment, a strict subset of the subjects from the regression
analysis above were identified to be inconsistent. The absence of S20 and S22 from T11,
and S15 from T12 left the number of inconsistent subjects at 5 in T11 and 3 in T12.
The levels of significance were also very close for those remaining in T12. The same was
found for S28 and S35 in T11, with significant changes for S3, S14 and S19, in the same
directions as for the t-tests.
Thus around 10-20% of subjects in total displayed choice inconsistency. With at least
80% of subjects choosing consistently, we conclude overall therefore that the consistency
found in the aggregate sample is quite robustly replicated at the level of individual sub-
jects.6
Results from Experiment 1 therefore lend considerable support to Hypothesis E. Some
support is also given to Hypothesis I (mainly vide findings from Wilcoxon tests reported
in Table 1). No evidence is found however to support Hypothesis P.
6Categorizing any subject as either consistent or inconsistent on the basis of Tables 4 and 5 we tested
whether the inconsistency rate (number of inconsistent subjects) differed across the treatments. We found
no difference in terms of a two-tailed or a one-tailed proportion test.
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3.2 Experiment 2
The central question remains whether a subject chooses differently the two occasions she
faces any reference problem. The measure of consistency in this experiment is the switch
rate. For any subject in any treatment, data on two choices are available for any reference
problem, one from each occasion it is faced. We will say there is no switch if the two
choices made are the same, and there is a switch if the two are different. The switch rate
for a subject is then the proportion of times she switched out of 20.
The definition of the switch rate therefore ignores whether the switch was from one
definite option to another, or whether it involved indifference (a switch from a definite
option to indifference or the other way round).7 As it happens, subjects chose one of the
two definite options for an overwhelming majority of problems. The indifference rate (the
number of times indifference was reported as a fraction of the total number of problems
faced by all subjects taken together) for reference problems was 111/1400 or about 8%
for T21 and 152/1400 or about 11% for T22. Additionally, most switches were from one
definite option to another: about 70% of all switches in T21 (180/249) and 60% in T22
(54/90).
As indicated in the final sentence of the paragraph above, the aggregate switch rate
is 249/700 or 35.5% in T21, and 90/700 or 12.9% in T22. We first test if these are
respectively positive. We calculated the switch rate for every subject using the procedure
above and tested whether the mean of this sample of 35 observations (using a t-test) for
any treatment was different from zero. We found they were: the right-tailed p-values for
both treatments were less than 0.001. The same result obtained when we used the median
instead of the mean (vide a Snedecor-Cochran sign test).
We then tested if the switch rate was different across the two treatments. The figures
given above suggest that the switch rate is higher for T21, where single-contingency
situations were faced first relative to T22, where two-contingency situations were faced
first. Statistical analysis revealed that average switch rates were indeed different across
the two. We performed a t-test as well as a Mann-Whitney test, both of which indicated
difference with two-tailed p-values less than 0.001.
Thus the data support the hypothesis that inconsistency may be greater when single-
7We admitted the indifference option to account for the following difficulty. A subject who is truly
indifferent between the two definite options could choose differently on the two occasions, if she does
not have the opportunity to express indifference, as a result of random choice. Her choice would then
be observationally inconsistent, whereas it actually is not. Permitting the subject to express indifference
allows such cases to be ruled out.
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contingency situations are faced earlier in the sequence, so decisions may be more likely
to be changed when irrelevant information arrives than when it departs. At the same
time, our finding is also that there is significant inconsistency when single-contingency
situations are faced later in the sequence. Hence the presence of some inconsistency in
decision-making may be endemic, and decisions may be likely to change whenever there
is alteration in associated irrelevant information.
We now disaggregate the data, to explore consistency at the levels of the subjects and
the problems.
3.2.1 Problems
Within any treatment, every reference problem was faced twice by any subject, and we
know for every problem whether a switch occurred or not. Coding a switch as 1, and a
consistent choice as 0, we therefore have a series of 35 independent observations (consisting
of zeros and ones) for every problem within each treatment.
We tested if the switch rates associated with the problems were positive. We used
a t-test as well as a Snedecor-Cochran test for every problem within the two treatments
separately. We found severe signs of inconsistency (allowing significance level upto 5%):
the null of zero switch rate was rejected for every problem in at least one treatment.
Consistency was found for only three problems in T21 (1,3,12) and 6 problems in T22
(6,7,9,14,15,20).8
Tables 8 & 9 below (for T21 and T22 respectively) report right-tailed p-values from
the tests, only for the problems displaying inconsistency.
We now analyze consistency across the two treatments for each problem by examining
whether there is variation in the switch rate. We found consistency, i.e., statistical indis-
tinguishability of switch rates, for 8 problems. Results from these tests are given Table
10 below, which reports two-tailed p-values only for the problems with cross-treatment
inconsistency.
There was thus substantive inconsistency within and across treatments for most prob-
lems. This leads us to conclude that the inconsistency found in the aggregate is strongly
reproduced at the level of individual problems. However the specific pattern found in
the aggregate was not replicated, as we found that the inconsistency rate (number of
inconsistent problems) did not differ across the treatments, in terms of either a two-tailed
or a one-tailed proportion test. The categorization of problems as either consistent or
8The numbers of the problems in the table below refer to an order independent of the treatments.
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Table 8: t-test and Snedecor-Cochran test resutls for T21 by problems
problem no. t-test Snedecor-Cochran
2 0.0016 0.0039
4 0 0
5 0 0
6 0 0.0002
7 0 0
8 0 0
9 0.0060 0.0156
10 0.0003 0.0009
11 0 0
13 0.0032 0.0047
14 0.0016 0.0039
15 0 0
16 0 0
17 0 0.0001
18 0 0
19 0 0
20 0.0001 0.0004
Table 9: t-test and Snedecor-Cochran test resutls for T22 by problems
problem no. t-test Snedecor-Cochran
1 0.0016 0.0039
2 0.0219 0.0625
3 0.0219 0.0625
4 0.0115 0.0312
5 0.0060 0.0156
8 0.0060 0.0156
10 0.0016 0.0039
11 0.0031 0.0078
12 0.0219 0.0625
13 0.0115 0.0312
16 0.0219 0.0625
17 0.0060 0.0156
18 0.0115 0.0312
19 0.0060 0.0156
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Table 10: Accross treatments comparison by problems
problem no. t-test Mann-Whitney
4 0 0.0001
5 0.0009 0.0013
6 0.0083 0.0092
7 0 0
8 0.0346 0.0356
11 0.0056 0.0064
15 0.0001 0.0002
16 0 0
17 0.0096 0.0106
18 0.0001 0.0002
19 0.0046 0.0055
20 0.0002 0.0003
inconsistent was on the basis of Tables 8 and 9.
3.2.2 Subjects
We now perform disaggregation at the level of subjects. The question is again whether
any of these 70 subjects in any treatment individually displayed inconsistency. As before,
this is a within treatment analysis.
For every subject, we know whether she switched or not for each of the 20 problems.
Consistency would be displayed for a problem by a subject if there is no switch and by
the subject overall if the switch rate is zero. We investigate consistency for each subject
once again both through comparison tests (t-tests and Snedecor-Cochran tests) as well as
through regression analyses.
For the latter approach, we estimated a linear probability model with Newey-West
correction for each subject. The strategy mirrors that applied to the data from Experiment
1. The dependent variable indicated whether a switch had been observed or not. There
was a constant, but no independent variable. The significance or lack thereof of the
constant is used to determine inconsistency or consistency respectively. Lags of 0, 1 and
2 again yielded similar results, and we report only results where lag 1 was specified.
The constant was found to be significant for 31 subjects in T21 (choices of S2, S4,
S5 and S12 displayed consistency). Results are shown in Table 11 below in a transposed
format.
Results from comparison tests for T21 are shown in Table 12, which has right-tailed
17
Table 11: Newey-West regression resutls for T21
subject constant subject constant
S1 .3∗∗ S21 .3∗
(0.093) (0.106)
S3 .35∗ S22 .45∗∗
(0.125) (0.116)
S6 .25∗ S23 .65∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.093)
S7 .25∗∗ S24 .3∗∗
(0.084) (0.108)
S8 .4∗∗ S25 .35∗∗
(0.124) (0.106)
S9 .45∗∗ S26 .35∗∗
(0.122) (0.114)
S10 .35∗∗ S27 .6∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.119)
S11 .4∗∗∗ S28 .35∗∗
(0.100) (0.114)
S13 .25∗ S29 .45∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.098)
S14 .35∗∗ S30 .4∗∗
(0.102) (0.119)
S15 .4∗∗ S31 .55∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.116)
S16 .45∗∗ S32 .35∗∗
(0.122) (0.114)
S17 .4∗∗ S33 .6∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.105)
S18 .3∗ S34 .4∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.095)
S19 .2∗ S35 .2∗
(0.082) (0.094)
S20 .35∗∗
(0.102)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
18
Table 12: t-test and Snedecor-Cochran test resutls for T21
subject t-test Snedecor-Cochran
S1 0.0051 0.0156
S3 0.0024 0.0078
S4 0.0210 -
S5 0.0105 -
S6 0.0010 0.0313
S7 0.0105 0.0313
S8 0.0010 0.0039
S9 0.0004 0.0020
S10 0.0024 0.0078
S11 0.0010 0.0078
S13 0.0105 0.0313
S14 0.0024 0.0078
S15 0.0010 0.0039
S16 0.0004 0.0020
S17 0.0010 0.0039
S18 0.0051 0.0156
S19 0.0210 -
S20 0.0024 0.0078
S21 0.0051 0.0156
S22 0.0004 0.0020
S23 0 0.0039
S24 0.0010 0.0001
S25 0.0024 0.0078
S26 0.0024 0.0078
S27 0 0.0002
S28 0.0024 0.0078
S29 0.0004 0.0020
S30 0.0010 0.0039
S31 0.0001 0.0005
S32 0.0024 0.0078
S33 0 0.0002
S34 0.0010 0.0039
S35 0.0210 -
Entries are right-tailed p-values
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p-values as entries. The t-tests find 33 subjects to be inconsistent (all but S2 and S12).
The Snedecor-Cochran procedure yields the number 29 (all but S2, S4, S5, S12, S19 and
S35).
For T22, the number of subjects displaying inconsistency was 7 (S3, S8, S14, S15, S16,
S24 and S35), according to the regression approach. Results are shown in Table 13 below.
Table 13: Newey-West regression reults for T22
S3 S8 S14 S15 S16 S24 S35
constant -.45∗∗∗ .25∗∗ .2∗ .35∗∗ .2∗ .25∗∗ .45∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.084) (0.082) (0.106) (0.094) (0.084) (0.091)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Comparison tests yielded somewhat similar results for T22. The results are shown
in Table 14 (entries are right-tailed p-values). The t-tests determined 10 subjects to be
inconsistent (S1, S3, S8, S9, S14, S15, S16, S25, S26 and S35) while the Snedecor-Cochran
tests found 5 (S3, S8, S15, S25 and S26).
Table 14: t-test and Snedecor-Cochran test resutls for T22
subject t-test Snedecor-Cochran
S1 0.0414 -
S3 0.0004 0.0020
S8 0.0105 0.0313
S9 0.0414 -
S14 0.0210 -
S15 0.0024 0.0078
S16 0.0210 -
S25 0.0105 0.0313
S26 0.0414 -
S35 0.0004 0.0020
Entries are right-tailed p-values
The results thus support the possibility that inconsistency may sometimes be endemic.
More than 80% of subjects displayed inconsistency in T21, where single-contingency situ-
ations arrived earlier in the sequence. Of course, less than one third of subjects displayed
inconsistency in the reverse sequence, hence the issue may not be equally serious in all set-
tings. Overall our conclusion is that the lack of consistency found in the aggregate sample
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is replicated at the level of individual subjects. Moreover, the pattern was also similar
to that in the aggregate: a proportion test of whether the inconsistency rate (number of
inconsistent subjects) differed across the treatments showed that the rate was higher in
T21 (p-value < 0.001). Categorization of subjects as either consistent or inconsistent was
done on the basis of Tables 11 and 13.
Results from Experiment 2 therefore unambiguously support Hypothesis P. No evi-
dence is found in favor Hypotheses I or E.
4 Conclusions
This paper reports results from experiments examining whether subjects’ contingent
choices satisfy consistency. It found that consistency may mostly be a reasonable pre-
sumption when contingencies are complete, and outcomes are monetary and immediate,
but is unlikely to fully hold in more complex and realistic settings.
We further found that decisions may be more likely to change when irrelevant or
extraneous information arises rather than subsides. Since actual decisions are often one-
shot and made in the presence of both irrelevant and relevant information, this suggests
that experimental explorations of consistency using a within subject design should control
for order effects to improve accuracy of results. Hence studies which only expose subjects
first to relevant information, and then to all information, relevant as well as irrelevant,
without counterbalancing, such as Dror, Charlton and Pe´ron [3], may be overstating the
degree of inconsistency.
The source of whatever failure of consistency is observed appears to be the use of
irrelevant information, emerging from alternative contingencies or choice problems, in
decision-making. Given that the use of such information is precluded by economic ra-
tionality, which in turn is closely related to consistency, our findings indicate that such
notions of rationality may not apply equally to all settings. This article may therefore
contribute to the continuing debate on whether or when Bayesian models of cognition or
behavior can generate testable hypotheses (see e.g. Zambrano [13] and Jones and Love
[8]). Many have shown within frameworks such as subjective expected utility theory (see
e.g. Savage [12]) that conditions for rationalizability can be found: Green and Park [6]
for example show that consistency of contingent plans is such a necessary and sufficient
condition. In this context, our results therefore suggest that the explanatory capacity of
the framework may be restricted to a limited range of settings.
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Appendix
Instructions for Experiment 1:
Thank you for your participation. Please read the instructions carefully.
You will face 40 questions one after the other. After finishing a question, please press
the CONTINUE button, and the next question will appear.
Here is a sample question:
You have decided to invest 100 rupees by buying units of financial options. There are
two options available, and one unit costs 1 rupee for either option. The table below gives
the possible returns and the corresponding chances per unit for both. How much of your
100 rupees will you invest in option 1, i.e., how many units of option 1 will you buy?
Whatever remains will be used to buy units of option 2. Your answer must be an integer
between and including 0 and 100.
O1 O2
return chance return chance
2.2 0.2 3.1 0.4
0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6
Thus, your answer here will be the number of units of option 1 you are buying.
Here is another sample question:
You have decided to invest 100 rupees by buying units of financial options. There are
two options available, and one unit costs 1 rupee for either option. The table below gives
the possible returns and the corresponding chances per unit for both. How much of your
100 rupees will you invest in option 1, i.e., how many units of option 1 will you buy?
Whatever remains will be used to buy units of option 2. Your answer must be an integer
between and including 0 and 100.
Thus, you will be giving two answers here, one the number of units of option 1 you
are buying if faced with a choice between options 1 and 2, and two the number of units
of option 1A you are buying if faced with a choice between options 1A and 2A.
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O1 O2
return chance return chance
2.2 0.2 3.1 0.4
0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6
What if the options are instead
(again, what you do not invest in 1A
will be automatically invested in 2A
and your answer must be an integer):
O1A O2A
return chance return chance
2.5 0.25 4 0.5
0.1 0.75 0.7 0.5
For every question, you will have to allocate 100 across two options each with two
possible returns. Here is an example on what you might expect to get as return, using
the second sample question.
Suppose you have chosen to invest 70 in option 1 and therefore 30 in option 2 for the
first case, and for the second case your choice is 40 in option 1A and therefore 60 in option
2A.
Then the outcomes for the first case can be either:
(1) 2.2 in option 1, and 3.1 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.2 ∗×0.4 = 8%. Then your
return is 70× 2.2 + 30× 3.1 = 247
(2) 2.2 in option 1, and 0.6 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.2×0.6 = 12%. Then your
return is 70× 2.2 + 30× 0.6 = 172
(3) 0.9 in option 1, and 3.1 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.8×0.4 = 32%. Then your
return is 70× 0.9 + 30× 3.1 = 156
(4) 0.9 in option 1, and 0.6 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.8×0.6 = 48%. Then your
return is 70× 0.9 + 30× 0.6 = 81
And the outcomes for the second case can be either:
(1) 2.5 in option 1, and 4 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.25 × 0.5 = 12.5%. Then
your return is 40× 2.5 + 60× 4 = 340
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(2) 2.5 in option 1, and 0.7 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.25× 0.5 = 12.5%. Then
your return is 40× 2.5 + 60× 0.7 = 142
(3) 0.1 in option 1, and 4 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.75 × 0.5 = 37.5%. Then
your return is 40× 0.1 + 60× 4 = 244
(4) 0.1 in option 1, and 0.7 in option 2. The chance of this is 0.75× 0.5 = 37.5%. Then
your return is 40× 0.1 + 60× 0.7 = 46
As you know, you will earn money for today’s participation, and how much you will
earn will depend on how you decide and some luck. Five of your investment choices will
be picked at random at the end, and their corresponding options will be implemented in
accordance with your choices. You will get the average of their returns, plus a fee for
showing up.
Let’s start! Read the questions carefully, and then choose.
Instructions for Experiment 2:
Thank you for your participation. Please read the instructions carefully.
You will face 40 questions one after the other.
Here is a sample question:
You have to choose one of the three options - C1, C2, C3. Put a tick (X) in the
relevant box.
Which cup would you prefer if the options are C1, C2 and C3?
C1  C2  C3 
1. Small 1. Small-Medium
2. No handle. 2. With handle
3. White with floral pattern 3. Light yellow no pattern Indifferent
4. Normal design 4. Octagonal design.
Please choose only one out of the three options. You are thus giving a single answer
here.
Here is another sample question:
Here too you have to choose one of the three options. Put a tick in the relevant box.
In either case, please choose only one out of the three options. You are thus giving
two answers here, your choice if faced with options C1, C2, and C3, as well as your choice
if faced with options C1A, C2A, and C3A.
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Which cup would you prefer if the options are C1, C2 and C3?
C1  C2  C3 
1. Small 1. Small-Medium
2. No handle. 2. With handle
3. White with floral pattern 3. Light yellow no pattern Indifferent
4. Normal design 4. Octagonal design.
What if the options are instead
C1A  C2A  C3A 
1. Small-Medium 1. Small
2. Base smaller than rim. 2. Base and rim are of same size
3. Black with geometric pattern 3. White with blue band Indifferent
4. Hexagonal design 4. Hexagonal design.
For every question, you will face some good, durable, activity, asset or service, with
four characteristics given for any option. There will be two main options. You will have
to compare and choose one of them. Or you can be indifferent.
Let’s start! Read the questions carefully, and then choose.
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